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INTRODUCTION
Professor Tamar Frankel’s excellent book, Fiduciary Law, is a thorough and
comprehensive look at the fiduciary-law forest. My contribution to the
Symposium on The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First
Century is one leaf on one branch of one tree in the forest that Professor
Frankel so expertly navigates. In this Essay, I explore the fiduciary
relationship between corporate directors and officers and the shareholders they
serve. I examine how the breach of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders has
the power to dramatically impact non-shareholder groups.
Professor Frankel accurately observes that “[f]iduciary duties are anchored
in the interests of the parties to the relationship rather than the public’s
interests.”1 But her statement ignores the expansive reach and impact of
fiduciary law in general and fiduciary duty breach in particular. Corporate
fiduciaries’ inattentiveness to the fiduciary obligations they owe shareholders
can significantly impact non-shareholder constituencies. The breach of
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders deleteriously impacts the public interest
in some instances. Local and global communities can be affected by corporate
fiduciaries’ breach of the obligations they owe shareholders. In this Essay, I
explore the significance of this observation in the context of subprime
mortgage lending and the securitization of subprime mortgages that major
financial institutions undertook in the years leading up to the 2008 financial
crisis.
This Essay makes no contribution to the discussion about mortgage brokers
and lenders and whether they owe fiduciary duties to consumers. The focus of
this Essay is on the fiduciary duties that financial institution directors and
managers owed their shareholders in the process of securitizing subprime
∗
1

Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.
TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 166 (2011).

1191

1192

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91: 1191

mortgages. The participation of financial institution managers in the
predatory subprime lending debacle that contributed to the 2008 economic
downturn harmed shareholders and consumers along with local and global
communities. The harm to consumers and communities has proven to be
deeper and more enduring than the harm to shareholders,2 but the most salient
aspect of my thesis is the fact that corporate fiduciary duty breaches have a
pervasive impact beyond the shareholders to whom fiduciaries owe duties.
The factual context explored in this Essay – financial institutions’ involvement
in the securitization of subprime loans – vividly illustrates the expansive
impact of fiduciary duty breach beyond corporate shareholders.3
Professor Frankel makes clear that when the public interest conflicts with
shareholder primacy and wealth-maximization goals, courts may enforce duties
that fiduciaries owe shareholders rather than enforce fiduciaries’ compliance
with law and regulation that protect the public interest.4 “When regulation
supporting public needs conflict with corporate business purposes, some courts
have ‘opposed using concepts of fiduciary duty to attain desired public
policies, even when the policies had been enacted legislatively.’”5 Courts may
defer to corporate officers and directors who fail to comply with law if
noncompliance would make a great deal of money for the shareholders to
whom fiduciaries owe duties.6 The fiduciary breach that I explore in this
Essay involves the failure of Wall Street fiduciaries to monitor compliance
with law, but this monitoring failure does not conflict with shareholder wealthmaximization goals. When the fiduciaries of financial firms failed to fulfill
their obligation to monitor compliance with laws enacted to protect the public
interest, the public was harmed and shareholders were harmed.7 In other
words, the public interest converged and aligned with the interests of
shareholders.

2 Most shareholders have diversified portfolios so that losses from one investment are
offset by gains in another. Shareholders, therefore, are typically less vulnerable than are
consumers whose wealth is bound in a single investment – their homes.
3 For another article exploring how fiduciary duty breaches harm shareholders and
employees, see Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 389 (2002)
(“[B]oards and executives breach their fiduciary duty of care owed to shareholders when
they fail to investigate and monitor their employees’ complaints of racism.”).
4 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 166 (citing William E. Nelson, The Law of Fiduciary Duty in
New York, 1920-1980, 53 SMU L. REV. 285, 307-12 (2000)).
5 Id. (quoting Nelson, supra note 4, at 309).
6 Id. at 166-67.
7 Cf. BOCIAN ET AL., UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE
PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 5 (Ctr. for Responsible Lending 2006).
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SUBPRIME LENDERS, SHAREHOLDERS, CONSUMERS, AND COMMUNITIES

In the introduction of her book, Professor Frankel explains that all fiduciary
relationships involve the entrustment of property and power to the fiduciary.8
Frankel’s focus is on the parties in the relationship. Her work deals with the
fiduciary and the party she calls the Entrustor – the person with whom the
fiduciary deals and to whom the fiduciary owes duties.9 This perspective is
essential in understanding the relationship between corporate shareholders –
the Entrustors – and the fiduciaries to whom they entrust property and power.
But also important is the insight discussed in this Essay that focuses on the
idea that so much more is entrusted to corporate fiduciaries. Even though
corporate directors and managers owe them no fiduciary duty, local, national,
and global communities entrust corporate leaders with inordinate amounts of
power. Business leaders make hugely impactful decisions that relate to almost
every important aspect of public life – from the food we eat to the medicines
we take and the doctors we consult.10 Business leaders are entrusted with
shareholder investments and the public welfare when they pursue shareholder
wealth-maximization goals.
The power that business leaders wield with respect to the public’s wellbeing – while pursuing profits for shareholders – is vividly illustrated in the
increase in subprime lending that immediately preceded the 2008 economic
downturn. In the first decade of the Twenty-First Century, a disproportionately
high number of people of color received predatory subprime mortgages.11 The
senior executives of several mortgage lenders pursued profits for their
investors, the constituencies to whom they owed fiduciary duties, by targeting
communities of color for predatory subprime mortgages.12
It is important, at this point, to distinguish subprime mortgages from
predatory mortgages. Subprime loans extended to low-income borrowers have
enabled many to finance homes that they could not otherwise purchase.13 The
8

FRANKEL, supra note 1, at xiii.
Id.
10 Leaders in the private sector are also now in the business of providing essential
services traditionally provided by local, state, and federal governments. In recent years, forprofit companies have established private businesses that educate our children, and run
prisons and hospitals. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform
Public Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 325 (1999).
11 See, e.g., BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (“Several analyses . . . have shown that
African-American and Latino borrowers received a disproportionate share of higher-rate
home loans, even when controlling for factors such as borrower income and property
location.”).
12 See GARY DYMSKI, UNDERSTANDING THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
AND THEORETICAL VIEWS 17 (2010) (describing financial institutions’ shift towards using
subprime mortgages as providing a “‘major source of revenues and perceived profits for
both the investors and the investment banks’” (quoting Jenny Anderson & Vikas Baja, Wary
of Risk, Bankers Sold Shaky Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A1)).
13 Id. at 16.
9
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interest rates of subprime loans are higher than the rates on prime loans to
account for the risk that lenders take that they will not be repaid.14 The
assessment of the risk that a borrower will fail to repay the loan is based on the
borrower’s income level and credit history.15 On the other hand, predatory
loans involve exorbitant fees that have nothing to do with the borrower’s
creditworthiness. Predatory lenders steer borrowers into high-interest loans
without regard to whether they can pay them, even when borrowers qualify for
loans with lower interest rates and fewer fees.16 Predatory lending involves
“excessive or unnecessary fees or steer[ing] borrowers into expensive loans
when they could qualify for more affordable credit. The costs and fees packed
in predatory loans extend beyond reasonable risk-based pricing.”17
There is convincing evidence that many of the subprime mortgages
originated by nonbank mortgage companies and brokers were predatory
loans.18 Local, state, and federal investigations across the nation have revealed
that brokers and loan originators targeted people of color for predatory
subprime mortgages.19 “In the contemporary United States mortgage loan
market, the predominant fair lending issue is no longer denial of loan
applications; it is instead the fact that minority homeowners pay much more in
interest rates and are much more likely to get risky subprime mortgages that
lead to foreclosure.”20
People of color, particularly vulnerable to predatory lending practices
because they are under-served by banks and financial institutions in the prime
market, were targeted for subprime loans even when they had good credit
histories. Even middle- and upper-income African Americans and Latinos
were twice as likely as middle- and upper-income whites to receive high cost
loans, even though they qualified for prime rate loans.21
14

Id. at 14.
See, e.g., id. at 13.
16 See Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise
in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2008).
17 Nikitra S. Bailey, Predatory Lending: The New Face of Economic Injustice, 32 HUM.
RTS. (Summer 2005) 14, 14.
18 See, e.g., BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 19.
19 See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 17.
20 Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based
Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 678, 678 (2009). For example, in 2004, African
Americans were “four times as likely as whites to pay subprime rates on their mortgage
loans.” Id. at 683. “Latinos were over three times more likely than whites to receive
subprime loans.” Richard Marsico & Jane Yoo, Racial Disparities in Subprime Home
Mortgage Lending in New York City: Meaning and Implications, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1011, 1016 (2009). People of color lost between $164 billion and $213 billion during the
height of the subprime lending crisis. See AMAAD RIVERA ET AL., FORECLOSED: STATE OF
THE DREAM 2008, at vii (2008).
21 Predatory Lending and the Mortgage Crisis: A Modern Example of Structural Racism,
ERASE RACISM, 1 http://www.eraseracismny.org/html/library/housing/resources/published_
15
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African Americans received 17.6% of all home purchase loans and 38.8%
of all subprime home purchase loans . . . . In contrast, whites received
36.4% of all home purchase loans and 17.0% of all subprime home
purchase loans . . . . Latinos received 13.8% of all home purchase loans
and 22.2% of all subprime home purchase loans . . . . Slightly more than
half of all home purchase loans to African Americans (50.5%) were
subprime. Only 10.7% of all home purchase loans to whites were
subprime.22
Allegations that certain mortgage companies targeted people of color for unfair
high-cost loans were made over a decade before the economic downturn. In
1996, one mortgage originator, Ameriquest, settled a suit brought by the
Justice Department claiming that the company targeted women and minority
borrowers for high-cost loans.23 By the turn of the century, the corporate
culture at Ameriquest was one that encouraged its loan officers, many of whom
were undereducated and inexperienced, to make loans in order to generate
generous profits for the company even when the transactions resulted from
egregiously fraudulent practices.24 According to two financial writers,
Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, forgery and fraud were integral components
of Ameriquest’s daily business practices.25
Ameriquest was not a public company, but other lenders who engaged in
predatory practices were.26 The Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation
insured many loans originated by Countrywide, a public company. The
insurance company sued Countrywide, alleging that Countrywide loan officers
engaged in fraudulent practices.27 Other lawsuits were brought against
reports/Predatory_lending_mortgage_crisis.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (citing Les
Christie, Foreclosures Linked to Subprime Fraud, CNNMONEY.COM (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/31/real_estate/NY_needs_more_lending_ovesight/index htm
. ). Some white borrowers were also inappropriately steered into high-fee, high-interest-rate
loans even though they qualified for traditional mortgages. See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 127
(2010).
22 Marisco & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1015-16.
23 See Kimberly Blanton, Reilly Urges Consumers to Avoid Ameriquest, BOS. GLOBE,
Jan. 24, 2006, at D4.
24 See MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 21, at 128-31 (explaining that loan officers “got a
small base salary, but made most of their money on commissions – typically 15 percent of
all the revenue they generated. And the perks were fabulous.”).
25 Id. at 130-37. Professor Frankel explains the impact of a corporation’s culture on the
willingness of the firm’s employees to comply with law. “Lawmakers and corporate leaders
adopt and spread their own culture. They may also influence society’s obedience to law by
their own attitude toward the law; if they criticize or disparage the law they may undermine
obedience.” FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 275.
26 See, e.g., MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 21, at 87.
27 Id. at 226-28 (“In a lawsuit that would later be filed by the Mortgage Guaranty
Insurance Corporation . . . investigators went back and dug up details of some of the loans
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Countrywide making similar allegations of fraud. The company settled a suit
brought by Elliot Spitzer, then New York State’s Attorney General.28 The
Spitzer suit alleged that Countrywide had improperly pushed African
American and Latino borrowers into high-cost loans.29
Mortgage originators such as Countrywide and Ameriquest harmed
consumers in order to make money for shareholders. The mortgage lenders’
shareholders did profit in the short term, but eventually huge losses hurt
shareholders also. Some decisionmakers at mortgage originators like
Countrywide and Ameriquest breached fiduciary duties owed to shareholders
by intentionally violating the law. Board members and senior executives, if
they were unaware of the violations, breached fiduciary duties owed
shareholders by failing to monitor compliance with law.30
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, The Fair Housing Act (FHA),31
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race when making or purchasing loans
for purchasing, constructing, or improving a dwelling.32 Nonbank mortgage
lenders violated the FHA when they targeted African American and Latino
borrowers for predatory loans.33 The directors and managers of these nonbank
lenders owed their shareholders fiduciary duties that include the duty to
monitor the company’s compliance with all applicable law, including the FHA.
Directors and officers who breached these fiduciary duties harmed
shareholders when the subprime business collapsed. Consumers were harmed
also. For Ameriquest, a private company, harm to shareholders is socially
insignificant. Harm to shareholders becomes more troubling for a publiclyheld company like Countrywide. But, Wall Street’s relationship to nonbank
mortgage lenders and the participation of this nation’s most venerable financial
institutions in the securitization process most vividly illustrates the link
between breaching fiduciary duties owed to shareholders and the impact of that
breach on local, national, and global communities.
II.

PREDATORY LENDERS AND THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT DID
BUSINESS WITH THEM

The relationship between Wall Street firms such as Lehman Brothers, Bear
Stearns, and Merrill Lynch, on the one hand, and predatory mortgage lenders,
Countrywide had made during the subprime bubble.”).
28 See Countrywide Agrees to Adopt Controls to Ensure Fair Lending, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2006, at C2.
29 See Kathleen Day, Countrywide Reaches Deal After Bias Probe, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2006, at D02.
30 See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
32 42 U.S.C. § 3605; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_coverage.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
33 See, e.g., John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 636 (2008).
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on the other, involved two aspects. First, Wall Street firms provided large
loans to nonbank mortgage lenders that enabled them to make predatory loans
to prospective homeowners.34 Second, nonbank lenders were funded when
they sold mortgages to major financial institutions as part of a securitization
process in which investors purchased interests in pooled mortgages.35 Wall
Street firms securitized the subprime mortgages they purchased and sold the
income stream to investors.36 Mortgage lenders and brokers who engaged in
fraudulent and predatory lending could not have remained in business without
the help of Wall Street’s venerable financial institutions.37
Corporate giants like Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Wells
Fargo, and Goldman Sachs bought mortgages from nonbank lenders that
engaged in overtly fraudulent and discriminatory practices while passing all
the risks of default onto the financial institutions.38 When huge numbers of
borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, executives who ran the financial firms
that had purchased and securitized the mortgages claimed that they did not
fully understand what they had purchased.39 For the most part, the nation has
accepted the narratives of financial institution managers and executives who
say that they could not have foreseen the economic collapse and had no way of
understanding the financial forecast for the complex and pioneering
transactions that were part of the subprime lending and securitization
processes.
Did boards and senior managers at the Wall Street firms that securitized
subprime loans breach fiduciary duties they owed their shareholders?
Shareholder litigation alleging fiduciary duty breaches in the context of Wall
Street’s participation in subprime lending has failed to uncover the precise
nature of the fiduciaries’ lapses.40 It is imperative that the nature of fiduciary
obligation in this context be fully understood. Corporate directors and officers
owe shareholders and the corporations for whom they serve an obligation of
good faith. This obligation of good faith includes a duty to monitor corporate
employees’ compliance with law.41
Professor Frankel discusses the

34

See DYMSKI, supra note 12, at 15.
See, e.g., PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET
CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 66 (2008) (describing nonbank lenders as
“act[ing] as intermediaries in the mortgage process (using money delivered at the closing
table by giants like Countrywide) . . . then [selling] it away to an investor such as
Countrywide, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, or any other number of wholesale giants”).
36 See DYMSKI, supra note 12, at 15-16.
37 See, e.g., MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 281.
38 See id.
39 See, e.g., id. at 273, 283.
40 Cf. Kevin LaCroix, Subprime-Related Derivative Lawsuits: The List, THE D&O DIARY
(Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/subprime-litigation/subprime
related-derivative-lawsuits-the-list/ (enumerating derivative suits filed in 2007 and 2008).
41 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 129.
35
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monitoring obligations of corporate boards as a duty of care issue.42 This was
the prevailing view until recent Delaware decisions included monitoring
obligations in the analysis of boards’ good faith obligations.43 Professor
Frankel cites to scholars who took note of this shift in corporate governance
analysis.44 Courts make monitoring obligations an integral part of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty when they are willing to explore whether a board’s
failure to monitor compliance was a bad faith lapse.45 Boards and officers who
fail to make a good faith effort to monitor compliance with law breach the
fiduciary duty of loyalty. This is a significant analytical shift. Judges are
much less likely to defer to business decisions or inaction that breach the duty
of loyalty than they are with respect to care breaches. When a board’s failure
to monitor compliance with law was construed as a duty of care breach, the
board’s lapse was meaningless. This is because the import of corporate law’s
fiduciary duty of care has eroded as a result of the enactment of exculpation
clauses such as Delaware’s section 102(b)(7).46 This statute allows Delaware
companies to include a provision in the certificate of incorporation that limits
or eliminates directors’ personal liability for breaches of the duty of care.
Now that a board’s bad faith failure to monitor compliance is considered a
loyalty breach rather than a care breach, monitoring obligations become more
significant. Professor Frankel makes clear that the Delaware monitoring cases
require “a sustained or systematic failure” to exercise oversight in order to
establish bad faith.47 She explains that a board decision that results in a “[b]ad
outcome is not bad faith.”48 But the emergence of a shift in analysis of
monitoring breaches should inspire boards to be more vigilant about installing
controls that will provide them with information about a firm’s failure to
comply with law.
Until recently, the corporate fiduciary’s obligation to act in good faith was a
nebulous concept. In shareholder litigation against The Walt Disney
42

Id. at 169.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 560 (2008) (“Historically, a director’s duty of good faith
was ‘subsumed in a court’s inquiry into the director’s satisfaction of her duties of care and
loyalty.’ In recent years . . . Delaware cases hinted that good faith was a freestanding duty .
. . .” (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in
Takeovers and Mergers, in FIRST ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 911, 918 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B0-021D
2003))).
44 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 129 (citing Bainbridge et al., supra note 43, at 559).
45 See Bainbridge et al., supra note 43, at 561-62 (discussing how the Delaware Court
recently found that a board has an affirmative duty to ensure its company’s compliance with
law).
46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
47 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 177 (quoting Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006)).
48 Id.
43
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Company, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified corporate law’s bad faith
concept.49 The court explained that board members act in bad faith when they
intend to do harm, or when directors intentionally or consciously disregard
their responsibilities.50
Some Wall Street firms such as Merrill Lynch became subprime lenders
themselves by acquiring a nonbank lending firm or by opening a subprime
division.51 Did directors and senior executives at these firms fail to fulfill their
good faith obligation to monitor their employees’ compliance with the FHA
which prohibits discrimination in connection with mortgage regulation?
Most Wall Street firms, however, did not employ the people who dealt with
borrowers and approved applications.52 What responsibility did the financial
institutions that securitized the mortgages have to ensure that the companies
from whom they purchased mortgages complied with the FHA? Did financial
institutions such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, and others owe a duty to
their shareholders to ensure that the nonbank lenders from whom they
purchased subprime mortgages complied with the FHA, which embodies the
nationally articulated public policy against housing discrimination? What
about the Wall Street firms’ obligation to monitor compliance with laws and
regulations that prohibit consumer fraud?
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know just how risky Wall Street’s
involvement in the subprime market was. It seems that at the least, Wall Street
boards and executives were grossly negligent when they purchased predatory
mortgages without understanding that the loan officers who originated them
engaged in fraudulent practices that made repayment of the loans highly
unlikely. The Disney court, however, made clear that grossly negligent
conduct does not constitute bad faith that breaches the duty of loyalty.53 A
board that behaves in grossly negligent ways breaches its fiduciary duty of
care. And, as stated earlier, as a practical matter, care breaches have been
rendered irrelevant under exculpation clauses such as Delaware’s section
102(b)(7).54
49 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-66 (Del. 2006). The
Disney case involved shareholder challenges to the Disney board’s decision to hire Michael
Ovitz as the company’s president. After working for Disney for only fourteen months,
Ovitz was terminated without cause. Id. at 35. He received a $130 million severance
payout even though his fourteen-month tenure at Disney was replete with problems. Id. at
35, 42.
50 Id. at 66-67 (adopting the lower court’s definition of bad faith, involving conscious
disregard of duties – among other things – as an acceptable but not exclusive definition).
51 See MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 186-203.
52 See, e.g., id. at 192 (describing how Bear Stearns’s subsidiary, EMC, did not directly
employ persons, as “[h]aving retail employees to pay would result in more full-time
equivalents”).
53 Disney, 906 A.2d at 64-65.
54 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the Delaware exculpatory
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Only loyalty breaches are legally significant and monitoring failures are
loyalty breaches only if a board consciously disregards its responsibility. Only
an intentional dereliction of duty or a conscious disregard of responsibility
constitutes bad faith that breaches the duty of loyalty. Did financial
institutions’ boards consciously disregard their responsibilities when they
purchased and securitized predatory subprime loans? Did they act in bad faith,
thereby breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty?
Here is the analytical problem. It is easily argued that these were not
instances where directors consciously disregarded responsibilities. It can be
said that the boards did not engage in an intentional dereliction of duty. Board
members did what so many of us may have done if we served as directors: they
did not fully understand the risks. The companies were making money – at
least initially. Like the rest of us, the boards heard predictions about the
imminent bursting of the housing bubble. But they most likely concluded that
the smart executives who managed the companies would save the companies
and shareholders from harm. In other words, they turned a blind eye to the
inherent and irrational risks of predatory subprime lending.
There is a small but significant gap between gross negligence and conscious
disregard of duty. The willful blindness doctrine fills this gap. In American
(and English) jurisprudence “willful blindness” is the equivalent of actual
knowledge where a person deliberately avoided information about a fact that
would otherwise be obvious. Negligence or mistake will not establish willful
blindness. Willful blindness is established, however, where it is shown that
there was a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of the critical facts.55
This concept of willful blindness is potentially helpful in analyzing fiduciary
duty breach, particularly with respect to the obligation to monitor compliance
with law that has become part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Directors and
officers who are willfully blind because they have made “a deliberate effort to
remain ignorant of the critical facts” have engaged in an intentional dereliction
of duty.56 They have consciously disregarded their obligations. Their failure
to monitor is a failure to act in good faith. They have breached their fiduciary
duty of loyalty.
The complication with this analysis in the context of failure to monitor
compliance with respect to mortgages purchased by the managers of financial
institutions is not found in the complexity of assessing risk. Financial
institution directors and senior executives knew that risk management teams
were in place at their firms. Unfortunately, they turned a blind eye to the
corporate culture at their firms that rendered the conclusions and analyses of
risk managers irrelevant because they were ignored. Financial institution
leaders claimed that they did not understand the risk of predatory lending. But
statute).
55 Eugene S. Becker & Stephen H. Marcus, Turning a Blind Eye: Willful Blindness as
Actual Knowledge, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 2010, at 1.
56 Id.
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their lack of understanding was not caused by the complexity of the risks taken
nor by an inability to understand them. Wall Street directors and managers did
not understand the risks because they turned a blind eye to those risks. They
made “a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of the critical facts” that would
have revealed the excessive nature of their risk taking.57 Take the example of
Merrill Lynch. McLean and Nocera reveal that John Breit, a risk manager at
Merrill who attempted to warn decisionmakers about the irrational risks
inherent in continuing in the subprime business, was slowly stripped of his
authority after he questioned risky trades.58 Breit’s diligence in assessing
Merrill’s exposure to risk resulted in his isolation from the kind of information
he needed in order to adequately do his job.59 Merrill’s risk management
function had become ineffective and Stan O’Neal, Merrill’s CEO at the time,
did not realize that the company’s risk management controls had been rendered
useless.60
One author observed that “Wall Street was afflicted with a kind of willful
blindness or magical thinking. Each of the Street’s five large investment
banks, together with the investment banking divisions of giant global banks
such as Citigroup and UBS, was fixated on doing whatever it took to maximize
its short-term profits.”61 Arguably, if Wall Street boards and senior executives
had not turned a blind eye, they would have discovered the accusations,
investigations, and litigation, revealing serious problems with the loans they
purchased from nonbank lenders. Directors and officers may have foreseen the
disastrous outcome of securitizing predatory subprime mortgages. Instead,
Wall Street boards and executives avoided the truth about the nonbank lenders’
fraudulent and deceptive dealings with borrowers.
Circumstances at Ameriquest provide another vivid example of the willful
blindness of some mortgage lenders’ decision-makers. The firm hired a
mortgage specialist to investigate allegations of pervasive fraud committed by
the company’s loan officers.62 When interviewed by financial writers, the

57

Id.
MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 21, at 236-38, 314-17 (“Though [Breit] was one of the
few people left at Merrill with the knowledge and background to sniff out problem trades,
he was shut out entirely.”). This was dangerous because, ordinarily, “risk managers were
the ones who imposed the reality checks that the traders preferred to ignore.” Id. at 237.
59 See id. at 314-17 (illustrating how Breit’s deteriorating access to information made
conversations with Merrill’s CEO “sobering”; O’Neal “had no idea that Breit had been
pushed aside”).
60 Id. at 316-17; see also GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS 3-7 (2010) (describing
the demise of Merrill Lynch, forcing its sale to Bank of America, that was precipitated by its
entry into the subprime mortgage business).
61 SUZANNE MCGEE, CHASING GOLDMAN SACHS: HOW THE MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE
MELTED WALL STREET DOWN . . . AND WHY THEY’LL TAKE US TO THE BRINK AGAIN 133
(2010).
62 MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 21, at 133-34.
58
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specialist concluded that he had been “brought in to provide cover.”63 The
specialist revealed that he “would record [the fraud] he found, send it to
management – and nothing would happen.”64 In a subsequent employment
discrimination suit, the specialist said “he was turned down for promotions, cut
out of decision making, and eventually fired.”65 The specialist discovered that
Ameriquest had “‘engaged in massive fraud for years’. . . . ‘My problem was,
they did not want to know.’”66
Another Ameriquest employee named Christopher Warren left the firm to
start his own mortgage lending firm called WTL Financial.67 In an online
confession, Warren revealed that his new company “faked credit scores, pay
stubs, and bank statements in order to sell $810 million in securities backed by
his loans. He could get away with it because Wall Street didn’t care.”68
Wall Street’s willful blindness to the irrational risks inherent in securitizing
predatory subprime loans caused significant shareholder losses. The willful
blindness of the financial institutions’ directors and executives breached
fiduciary obligations of good faith and duties of loyalty owed to
shareholders.69 The breach of fiduciary duty also caused significant harm to
the consumers who could not make excessively high mortgage payments. The
shareholders who were harmed have started to recover now that Wall Street
firms are earning profits again – with taxpayers’ help.70 But the consumers
who were harmed by the breaches of duties that fiduciaries owed shareholders
have lost homes and continue to suffer years after the economy’s collapse.71
And, as consumers lost their homes, neighborhoods were destroyed and
American citizens continue to live in communities that seem to be irrevocably
decimated.72 When borrowers could not repay predatory loans, the global
economy suffered as those who had invested in the pooled mortgages lost
billions.73 Harm resulting from the breach of fiduciary duties owed
63

Id. at 134.
Id.
65 Id.
An arbitrator later decided against the wrongful dismissal claim by the
investigator, Ed Parker. Id.
66 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Parker).
67 Id. at 136-37.
68 Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
69 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (2006)
(“Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty . . . thereby demonstrating a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to
discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”).
70 See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AND THEMSELVES (2009).
71 See, e.g., Relman, supra note 33, at 636 (“[I]rresponsible subprime lenders left
countless homeowners saddled with mortgage debts they cannot afford and no way to save
their homes in a declining housing market.”).
72 See Johnson, supra note 16 at 1171.
73 See, e.g., Douglas A. McIntyre, Typhoid Mary & Finding the Man Who Started the
64

2011]

FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1203

shareholders reached non-shareholder groups of consumers and communities,
both local and global.
III. PUBLIC OPINION, DISCOURSE, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
What can be done about Wall Street boards and directors who ignored the
facts that evidenced the predatory nature of the subprime mortgages they
purchased and the fraud that was prevalent at some of the mortgage lending
firms with whom they did business? What will inspire fiduciaries to fulfill
their fiduciary duties, including the monitoring obligations they owe
shareholders?
Professor Frankel suggests that “public opinion [as] expressed in
newspapers, television and mass interaction by electronic devices” may change
the “powerful fiduciaries’ misbehavior.”74 But, she explains, this is most
likely to happen if that public opinion or social pressure, is “strong, loud, and
persistent.”75 Frankel explains that even after the eruption of the 2001-2002
accounting scandals at companies like Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco,
“[p]owerful fiduciaries, holding billions of the public’s money, did not alter
their way of thinking and behavior.”76 She writes that “[e]ven after the crash
of 2008 these powerful fiduciaries have not changed their way of life and
attitudes.”77 But, she notes that small changes in corporate governance have
occurred because “political power and public opinion” have changed.78
The type of willful blindness that plagued decisionmakers at firms that
purchased predatory mortgages, however, may prove impervious to change
because of the nature of public opinion, political power, and social pressure in
this context. The dominant discussion of predatory lending and Wall Street’s
involvement cannot inspire fiduciaries’ fulfillment of the duties they owe. An
examination of the national discourse about subprime lending in the aftermath
of the economic downturn reveals why this is so.
Conservative commentators captured much of the discussion about
subprime borrowers. Borrowers were labeled greedy and ignorant and were
considered undeserving of home ownership.79 Conservatives placed all of the

Global Recession, 24/7 WALL ST. (Feb. 2, 2009), http://247wallst.com/2009/02/02/typhoidmary-an/ (“Most economists blame the collapse of the [global] credit markets . . . on a drop
in US housing prices and devaluing of subprime mortgage-backed securities.”).
74 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at xiii.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 275.
77 Id.
78 Id. Frankel’s example of one small change in corporate governance resulting from a
change in political power and public opinion is the fact that top managers at Goldman Sachs
waived bonuses in 2009 after vociferous public criticism. Id. at 276.
79 See Gretchen Morgenson, Blame the Borrowers? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2007, § 3, at 1 (“It has become fashionable of late to say that America’s subprime borrowers
themselves deserve a good part of the blame for the mortgage mess. They were either
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blame for the predatory lending debacle, and even for the economic downturn
itself, on minority and low-income borrowers, ignoring the predatory lending
practices that precipitated the high number of foreclosures.80 When discussing
the mortgage and credit crisis that threatened our economic survival,
conservative commentators, academics, and pundits attacked the borrowers
while ignoring the culpability of Wall Street and nonbank lenders.
Conservatives spoke of personal responsibility, or the lack thereof, on the part
of borrowers who lied about their income, or borrowers who were too dumb to
realize that they could not afford the homes they bought.81 They were mostly
silent, however, about the predatory lending practices of mortgage brokers and
nonbank lenders and the Wall Street executives and managers who ignored the
practices.
In the documentary American Casino,82 an investigative journalist
interviewed defectors from financial institutions and mortgage lenders and
other industry insiders who revealed that in many instances the lenders, not the
borrowers, lied about the borrower’s income.83 Even when borrowers did not
qualify for a loan and could not repay it, predatory lenders inflated borrowers’
income in order to receive the high fees that are typically earned when
originating subprime loans.84 When the borrower defaulted on a loan, the
borrower lost the home, but lenders did not lose the fees they “earned” from
originating the loan.85
Neil Cavuto of Fox News said that “[l]oaning to minorities and risky folks is
a disaster.”86 Matt Drudge helped to disseminate a story that was attributed to
a HUD representative claiming that 5 million defaulted mortgages in the U.S.
were held by illegal immigrants. After this claim was made on a radio station,
and after Drudge included a link on his website to that station, the Phoenix
Business Journal published an article about a HUD spokesperson who said that
the agency had no information about the number of illegal immigrants who
greedy . . . or irresponsible . . . .”).
80 Cf. Larry Keller, Minority Meltdown: Immigrants Blamed for Mortgage Crisis, 133 S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (Spring 2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/
intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2009/spring/minority-meltdown (explaining that many
commentators blamed the Community Reinvestment Act, which encouraged lending to
people living in lower-income communities).
81 See William D. Cohan, The Elizabeth Warren Fallacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/the-elizabeth-warren-fallacy/.
82 AMERICAN CASINO (Table Rock Films 2009).
83 See Synopsis, AMERICAN CASINO, http://www.americancasinothemovie.com/synopsis
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
84 Stephen Holden, Meltdown on Wall Street, and Homeowners Left in the Lurch on
Main Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at C5.
85 AMERICAN CASINO, supra note 82.
86 Cavuto Suggests Congress Should Have Warned that “[l]oaning to minorities and
risky folks is a disaster”, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Sept. 19, 2008, 6:28 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200809190021.
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held bad mortgages.87 But, hours after this article appeared, Lou Dobbs
interviewed a conservative radio talk show host who repeated the falsehood.88
The day after the HUD spokesperson denied the story, Rush Limbaugh got in
on the act, embellishing the facts. Limbaugh said that HUD revealed that “5
million illegal immigrants were given mortgages . . . with fake social security
numbers . . . to go out and purchase homes that they didn’t have to pay
back.”89 Even after HUD denied this story, it was spread by bloggers, and on
other radio shows and cable networks.90
There was little to no discussion about successful and responsible lowincome borrowers in the discourse that took place in the aftermath of the
economic downturn. For example, one nonprofit, Neighborhood Housing
Services of Orange County, assists first-time home buyers by connecting them
with banks that make CRA loans.91 “In its 14-year history, the nonprofit has
helped 1,200 families buy their first homes. Score so far: No foreclosures and
a delinquency rate under 1 percent.”92 Another company, the Nehemiah
Project, is in the business of building and selling homes to the working poor of
New York City.93 The repayment rates on the loans made to the buyers of
almost four thousand homes are high, with only ten defaults since the business
began in the 1980s.94
Conservative commentators also criticized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
the reason for creating these institutions – making home ownership possible for
low-income borrowers.95 But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not lend
money to risky borrowers. The two entities bought loans from private lenders,
and most of the loans bought were not considered subprime.96 Moreover,
87

Mike Sunnucks, HUD Cries Foul Over Illegal Immigrant Mortgage Data, PHOENIX
BUS. J., (Oct. 9, 2008, 3:16 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2008/10/06/
daily54 html.
88 Keller, supra note 80 (describing how a San Diego talk show host appeared on Lou
Dobbs Tonight and “cited the bogus HUD statistic as a hard fact”).
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 See Ronald Campbell, Most Subprime Lenders Weren’t Subject to Federal Lending
Law, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER (Nov. 16, 2008), http://articles.ocregister.com/2008-1116/business/24714017_1_subprime-loans-federal-lending-law-low-income-loans/2.
92 Id.
93 Jim Zarroli, Low-Cost Brooklyn Housing Sees Few Foreclosures, NPR (Oct. 20,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113931948.
94 Id.
95 Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The CRA Scam and Its Defenders, LUDWIG VON MISES
INSTITUTE (Apr. 30, 2008), http://mises.org/daily/2963 (describing how Freddie Mac
pioneered securitization of high-risk subprime loans and how Fannie Mae pointed to
Countrywide as a role model for CRA lending).
96 See Wall Street, Not Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Led the Toxic Mortgage Market,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www responsiblelending.org/
mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/wall-street-not-fannie-mae html.
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private lenders originated more than eighty percent of the subprime loans made
to lower-income borrowers in 2006.97 The private sector was the engine
behind subprime lending during its peak years, 2004 through 2006.98
Some blamed the financial crisis of 2008 on the enactment of the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).99 The CRA was enacted to
require banks covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to refrain
from the discriminatory practice of redlining, a practice under which banks
refused to lend to minority and low-income residents.100 The CRA was
enacted to mitigate the effects of redlining. Conservatives argued that the
quest for increasing home ownership among minorities and working class
Americans caused the 2008 economic crisis. Larry Kudlow commented: “The
Community Reinvestment Act . . . literally pushed these lenders to make lowincome loans. . . . [Members of Congress’s] [l]iberal, guilt[y] consciences
forced banks and lenders to make lousy, substandard loans.”101 A professor of
economics made the following statement: “The thousands of mortgage defaults
and foreclosures in the ‘subprime’ housing market . . . is the direct result of
thirty years of government policy that has forced banks to make bad loans to
un-creditworthy borrowers.”102
There is, however, another perspective about the value of the CRA that
received far less attention in the public discourse about subprime mortgages.
The CRA applies to federally-insured depository banks; it does not apply to the
financial institutions, lenders, and brokers that dominated the subprime market
during the last decade. For example, the nonbank mortgage companies that
made eighty percent of the predatory subprime loans that defaulted were not
covered by the CRA.103 Moreover, the depository banks that are covered by
the CRA were sixty-six percent less likely to make subprime loans than were
97 David Goldstein & Kevin G. Hall, Private Sector Loans, Not Fannie or Freddie,
Triggered Crisis, MCCLATCHY (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www mcclatchydc.com/2008/10/12/
53802/private-sector-loans-not-fannie.html.
98 See id.
99 Robert Gordon, Did Liberals Cause the Sub-Prime Crisis?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=did_liberals_cause_the_sub
prime_crisis (detailing how the “Blame-CRA theme” was discussed in many conservative
forums, such as Freerepublic.com and The Cato Institute).
100 See, e.g., Randall Kroszner, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent
Mortgage Crisis, in REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 8, 8 (2009) (“The act required the banking regulators to
encourage depository institutions . . . to help meet the credit needs of their entire
community, including low- and moderate-income areas.”).
101 Morning Joe (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.90787.com/kudlow-on-morning-joe-blaming-crisis-on-loans-to-poor-people/.
102 Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage Meltdown
(Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo125 html.
103 Peter Dreier & John Atlas, The GOP’s Blame-ACORN Game, THE NATION (Nov. 10,
2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/gops-blame-acorn-game.
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nonbank lenders,104 and the subprime loans they did make had significantly
lower interest rates and were easier for borrowers to repay.105 Banks covered
by the CRA are subject to extensive federal oversight; nonbank mortgage
lenders are not. The lending practices of banks covered by the CRA have been
successful in that minority home ownership has increased with very low
default and foreclosure rates.106
Professor Frankel’s observation about social pressure and public opinion
and their role in inspiring fiduciaries to live up to the duties and obligations
they owe shareholders is inoperable in the predatory lending context. The
dominant discourse on the issue constructed minority borrowers as the only
irresponsible actors in the predatory lending debacle.107 For the most part, our
national discourse omitted discussion about nonbank lenders’ predatory
practices and the Wall Street fiduciaries who ignored them. Public opinion
about these issues was formed with only a small and inaccurate part of the
story. The nation blamed the borrowers and paid little to no attention to
nonbank lenders and the Wall Street firms that did business with them. There
was little public outrage, and no social pressure exerted with respect to
predatory lending practices and the fiduciaries who ignored them. There was
very little in the national reaction to inspire a change in the way financial
institution fiduciaries operate.
CONCLUSION
Professor Frankel, exploring the history of corporate fiduciary law observed
that “[a]s corporations grew in size and in influence over Americans’ life [sic],
there were arguments that management had a fiduciary relationship to the
employees and communities in which the corporations operated, as well as to
the nation.”108 She writes that “the balance between the shareholders’ interests
and those of other constituencies has changed throughout the years and is still
subject to debate.”109 In this Essay, I explored fiduciary breach on the part of
Wall Street directors and executives who failed to monitor compliance with
law aimed at protecting the public interest. In this context, the interests of
shareholders, consumers, and communities converged. The breach of fiduciary
duties harmed both shareholders and the public. I do not suggest that Wall
Street fiduciaries, or any other corporate fiduciary, should be deemed to owe
fiduciary duties as a normative matter to non-shareholder constituencies.
104

TRAIGER & HINCKLEY LLP, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: A WELCOME
ANOMALY IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 3 (Jan. 7, 2008), available at http://www.traigerlawb
.com/publications/traiger_hinckley_llp_cra_foreclosure_study_1-7-08.pdf.
105 Id. at 11.
106 See, e.g., Dreier & Atlas, supra note 103 (“[T]he CRA helped boost the nation’s
homeownership rate, particularly among black and Latino borrowers . . . .”).
107 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
108 FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 52.
109 Id. at 160.
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Instead, I offer an observation that highlights the importance of Professor
Frankel’s work to clarify the content of fiduciary duty. In the predatory
subprime lending context, a clearer understanding and articulation of the
fiduciaries’ duty to monitor compliance with law may have protected
shareholder interests and the interests of the consumers and communities that
were harmed.
The predatory practices common in subprime lending that helped to
precipitate the economic downturn violated consumer law and antidiscrimination law that prohibits discrimination in the housing context. I focus
on the lenders’ violations of housing law and the fact that fiduciaries ignored
noncompliance that adversely affected shareholders and impacted minority and
low-income borrowers. My focus on minority and low-income borrowers
demonstrates how two seemingly distant constituencies – shareholders, on the
one hand, and low-income and minority borrowers, on the other – become
interconnected when powerful fiduciaries breach duties.

